顯示具有 傳記 標籤的文章。 顯示所有文章
顯示具有 傳記 標籤的文章。 顯示所有文章

2026年8月30日 星期日

奇異衰敗學:百年企業為何從頂峰到解體?

 


由湯瑪斯·愛迪生創立的奇異公司,是一家超過百年的跨國工業公司。該公司在發電設備、航空引擎以及醫療放射性儀器等領域,都是領頭羊的角色。奇異公司的渦輪發電機被廣泛運用在世界各國的火力、水力與核能電廠中,可以說全球能源能夠穩定供應,有大半是仰賴奇異公司在幕後提供保固維修服務。這樣一家動見觀瞻、大到不能倒的巨型企業,卻在 2010 年後開始經歷一連串的營運波折,營運和股價逐步走下坡。《奇異衰敗學》便是整理出橫跨近十年的奇異公司經營高層關鍵策略與背景故事,內容特別著重在前後三任奇異執行長的描寫,以及他們推動的策略與後續成效。

全書讀來有如身歷其境般,讓讀者看到奇異決策者面對營運挑戰時所做的決定。從事後諸葛的角度來看,這些不夠睿智的決策累積下來,便足以讓奇異公司的營運逐步陷入泥沼,直到無力回天,奇異集團被迫拆分、出售旗下事業體以求生存。商場競爭變化莫測,但奇異集團的殞落卻了無新意,踩中了台灣許多公司一樣的地雷—「想賺快錢」。因為大型工業、工程計畫背後需要長期、穩定的資金供給,因此奇異公司早早就成立奇異金融服務公司,因應企業營運的需要。後期更因企業經營得當、手中持有大量現金流,所以進一步融資給外部企業,以獲得利息收益。

自此,金融服務成為奇異集團中的營收與成長動能的新秀與潛力股,一味重視營運成效的執行長與股東們,反而樂見開拓出新的商機。奇異金融的好日子隨著 2008 年次貸風暴發生而結束了。在美國政府開始嚴管捅出大婁子的華爾街時,發現奇異公司在執行金融服務時,根本不符合銀行法規。它以工業集團的角色取得低利資金,轉頭再以向市場發行高利率的短期商業本票,藉此賺進利差。這些近乎無本生意的獲利,全數用來變成奇異每年配發高股利給股東的本錢。這些快錢更是日漸腐蝕奇異公司專注於工業產品創新與競爭的迫切感,讓公司安於表面上年年順遂成長的營收。

在奇異金融公司成為眾矢之的,讓營業收益收斂的當下,全球綠色能源產業的浪潮,更打擊了長期穩定獲利的發電機部門。加上中國工業、發電產業的日益成長,逐漸進入中低階市場成為競爭對手,奇異集團的營運便進入迷航階段。在當時執行長想力保企業名聲,堅持發出高股利的命令下,奇異做出一連串進退失據的決策,終究讓這個幾乎等於美國夢的工業巨人,走向黯淡無光的局面。在 AI 時代,穩定的電力供應等於國力的延伸,因此奇異公司若能回歸企業核心競爭力的發電設備市場,成為主導全球的電力設備供應商,那肯定能再次發出耀眼的光芒。

Founded by Thomas Edison, General Electric (GE) is a multinational industrial company with more than 100 years of history. The company has long been a leading player in fields such as power generation equipment, aircraft engines, and medical imaging equipment. GE's turbine generators are widely used in thermal, hydroelectric, and nuclear power plants around the world. It would not be an exaggeration to say that a large part of the world's stable energy supply depends on the maintenance and warranty services provided by GE behind the scenes. Such a huge company, with a strong reputation and a size that made it almost impossible to fail, began to experience a series of business problems after 2010. Its business performance and stock price gradually went downhill. *The Rise and Fall of General Electric* looks back at the key strategies and stories behind GE's top management over nearly ten years. The book focuses especially on the three CEOs who led GE during this period, the strategies they introduced, and the results that followed.

Reading the book feels almost like being there, watching GE's decision-makers make difficult choices when facing business challenges. Looking back with the benefit of hindsight, these less-than-wise decisions gradually pushed GE's business into deeper trouble. In the end, the company had no way to turn things around and was forced to break up and sell off its businesses in order to survive. Business competition is always unpredictable, but GE's decline was actually nothing new. It fell into the same trap that many Taiwanese companies have faced—the desire to "make quick money." Large industrial and engineering projects require long-term and stable funding. That was why GE established GE Capital early on to support its business operations.

Later, because the company was doing well and had a large amount of cash flow, GE Capital began providing financing to outside companies in order to earn interest income. From that point on, financial services became a new source of revenue and growth for GE. The CEOs and shareholders, who were increasingly focused on business performance, were happy to see this new business opportunity grow.The good days of GE Capital came to an end with the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis. As the U.S. government began to tighten regulations on Wall Street after the financial industry caused such a huge mess, it discovered that GE's financial business did not fully comply with banking regulations. GE used its position as an industrial company to obtain low-cost funding. It then issued high-interest short-term commercial paper to the market and made money from the difference in interest rates. These almost risk-free profits became the money GE used to pay high dividends to its shareholders every year. This easy money gradually weakened GE's sense of urgency when it came to innovation and competition in its core industrial businesses. The company became too comfortable with its seemingly steady year-after-year revenue growth.

As GE Capital became the target of criticism and its profits began to shrink, the global growth of the green energy industry dealt another blow to GE's power generation business, which had long been a stable source of profits. At the same time, China's growing industrial and power generation industries gradually entered the mid- and lower-end markets and became new competitors. GE's business operations then entered a period of confusion and uncertainty. At the time, the CEO wanted to protect GE's reputation and insisted on maintaining high dividend payments. As a result, GE made a series of poor strategic decisions. In the end, this industrial giant, which was almost a symbol of the "American Dream," gradually lost its former glory and entered a dark period. In the age of AI, stable electricity supply has become an extension of national power. Therefore, if GE can return to its core strength in the power equipment market and become a leading global supplier of power equipment, I believe it can shine brightly once again.


2023年4月13日 星期四

徐重仁青春筆記

 

在台灣說到7-ELEVEN,應該是無人不知。其品牌力之大,一般人甚至會把去超商說成去「Seven」。現在的年青人或許不知,把7-ELEVEN這個超商經營模式帶到零售業頂端的幕後推手就是被尊稱為「流通業教父」的徐重仁。「徐重仁青春筆記」有點半自傳的味道,初期講述了他成長、求學的故事,後續則著重在描寫徐重仁在統一企業裡「社內創業」開創7-11的點滴。

想要人前顯貴,必得人後受罪,現在看7-ELEVEN幾乎稱霸超商零售半邊天,很難想像當初它剛成立時,是歷經解散公司合併於統一企業旗下的一個部門(超商事業部),在不被任何人看好的情況下,才交給對流通事業充滿熱情的徐重仁死馬當活馬醫。沒想到他亂世下重典,一出手先砍掉虧損連連的四十五家店,只留下有獲利的店面,如此一來隔年就達成損益兩平,避免整個超商事業被收掉。這也是徐重仁分享的一種「營養劑」的經營手法,對陷入經營困境的企業,最要緊的是「活下來」,提供讓企業維持活力的一帖營養劑,救起來之後再來治療。我們可以在徐重仁時期的統一超商次集團裡的子公司,看到許多這樣相互提供資源協助彼此的例子,這也是大型集團擁有的競爭優勢(口袋夠深)。

徐重仁也在書中分享在經營事業時他所採用的方法學:
第一、必須要多看、多學,也就是所謂的終身學習。
第二、要思考該怎麼做。
第三、給一個清楚的成長目標。
第四、為達成公司成長目標,一定選對人、用對人,不行,就換人。
第五、選對人之後,要授權。
第六、我塑造一個可以讓他們很安心的企業文化。
從上六點來觀察,他的領導風格是知人善用、充分授權。但也不會流於鄉愿,滿足於形式主義而不講究績效。

他發展出「舉重原理」的用人方法,對有期待的下屬給予訂出的目標,如果他夠投入做出的實績更好,表示能不斷再承擔更多的重擔,就會再給他「三合一」甚至「四合一」的目標。而對於無法達成目標的主管,就會調到二軍中,讓位給其它做的出成績的主管。或許就是這種充分授權、究講實績的管理作風,讓統一超商次集團在徐重仁領導下成長、茁壯。當然別忘了背後有統一企業的支持,在「天時、地利、人和」三者俱備的清況下,想複製台灣7-ELEVEN崛起的模式,很難。

2022年5月2日 星期一

鯨吞億萬:一個大馬年輕人,行騙華爾街與好萊塢的真實故事

閩南話有句俗語「翁偏A卡緊」,意指做事想要「彎道超車」最簡單的方法就是用騙的。比起針對市井小民作姦犯科的詐騙集團,「鯨吞億萬」書中所描述的金融犯罪,在犯罪所得金額、牽連人士階層以及佈局複雜縝密等各方面來看,根本是蠅量級vs超重量級。書中男主角(?)「劉特佐」捅出的金融騙局,既使翻拍成好萊塢電影也綽綽有餘,出版社拿「華爾街之狼」來比喻還算是略為保守。劉特佐操盤的「一馬公司」醜聞,直指前馬來西亞首相「納吉」執政時期的貪汙弄權,後續也成為馬來西亞政黨輪替的推力。

「鯨吞億萬」向讀者展示了一幅以華爾街為首的跨國銀行、國家主權基金以及好萊塢名流等元素構圖,塗上貪婪、濫權、紙醉金迷等色彩的敗德浮世繪,代價是馬來西亞全民未來數年的血汗錢,因為被掏空的對象是「國家」,主謀者則是一個40歲不到的大馬華人。劉特佐深知現今資本市場的運作和弊病,結交權貴進而利用他人的名聲招搖撞騙,遂行他想要成為Somebody的願望。

讀者可在書中看到許多過去不曾察覺的「資本世界遊戲規則」。例如:人謀不臧國家級的主權基金,讓主政者和基金管理人從中上下其手取得暴利,也是政客用來收買籠絡地方派系的資金。華爾街的大型投資銀行,在主導客戶IPO(首度公開發行)時,將會獲得高額的服務費。如果看好即將上市的股票/基金,也會一口氣承攬下來,等價格抬高後再出貨給市場大賺一筆。心術不正的銀行管理高層,甚至會收受回扣幫客戶高估資產價值、替虛假的交易背書、設立許多空殼公司帳戶。瑞士的私人銀行表面上替富翁進行財富管理,實際都是做一些「類洗錢」交易,像是在避稅天堂開立境外公司,購買各種公司債與基金來編織層層的假交易移轉資金。歐美各國的高價房地產、蘇富比拍賣的天價藝術品、鑽石珠寶和國際賭場中的巨額賭資,都是不義之財的常見去處。

有人說過「金錢像是照妖鏡,它會呈現出你內心真正的慾望」,也有人說「金錢像是台音響放大機,它會讓善者越善,惡者越惡」。劉特佐曾經獲有數十億美金的資產可以運用自如(即便它是騙來的),他卻只用來結交影視名流,在夜店一擲千金地擁美女喝名酒,不斷地辨派對,買私人飛機買遊艇,在賭裡裡豪賭。說穿了就是單純滿足感觀層級的慾望以及想成為眾人焦點的成名欲。共犯集團中的馬來西亞前首相夫人,則是不斷地用劉特佐提供的資金購買華服和珠寶。金錢確實照出這些人自身的格局,相比伊隆馬斯克種種「有錢人的任性」,高下立判。